Significant research has been devoted to detecting people in images and videos. In this paper we describe a human de- tection method that augments widely used edge-based fea- tures with texture and color information, providing us with a much richer descriptor set. This augmentation results in an extremely high-dimensional feature space (more than 170,000 dimensions). In such high-dimensional spaces, classical machine learning algorithms such as SVMs are nearly intractable with respect to training. Furthermore, the number of training samples is much (...) smaller than the dimensionality of the feature space, by at least an order of magnitude. Finally, the extraction of features from a densely sampled grid structure leads to a high degree of multicollinearity. To circumvent these data characteristics, we employ Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis, an effi- cient dimensionality reduction technique, one which pre- serves significant discriminative information, to project the data onto a much lower dimensional subspace (20 dimen- sions, reduced from the original 170,000). Our human de- tection system, employing PLS analysis over the enriched descriptor set, is shown to outperform state-of-the-art tech- niques on three varied datasets including the popular INRIA pedestrian dataset, the low-resolution gray-scale Daim- lerChrysler pedestrian dataset, and the ETHZ pedestrian dataset consisting of full-length videos of crowded scenes. (shrink)

Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity.

In this paper we examine the study of minerals from the Renaissance to the early nineteenth century in the light of the work of Michel Foucault on the history of systems of thought. In spite of a certain number of theoretical problems, Foucault's enterprise opens up to the historian of science a vast terrain for exploration. But this is the place neither for a general exegesis nor for a general criticism of his position; our aim here is the more modest (...) one of taking certain points from Foucault's study,The order of things, and seeing how far they can be extended into an area not explicitly considered in that work. (shrink)

Until fairly recently a common way of doing history of science was to pick up an important strand of contemporary scientific thought and to trace its origin back to the philosophical tangle of the scientific revolution. This approach conveniently by-passed the breakdowns of once useful and pervasive theories, and neglected the long intellectual journeys along devious routes. History of science read like a success story; the pioneers who failed were neither dismissed nor excused; they were simply ignored. The historian knew (...) what he was hunting for and he was careful to limit his search to areas where his quarry was sure to be found. This method, which has been dubbed the precursor-view, stands in contrast—albeit, not in opposition—to the contextual method, which aims at a better understanding of the actual thought-processes of the early scientists. On this second view, history of science must not only account for present theories in the light of past developments, it must also assess old theories in terms of the scientist's conceptual framework, and judge them against the background of the world picture of his age. This may lead the historian down the blind alleys of the past, chasing spurious attempts at explaining the nature of physical reality, but it can clear the ground for a less anachronistic interpretation of the emergence of modern science and the actual process of discovery. History of science acts as a winnowing fork, but we cannot suppose that the discoverer himself always separated the wheat from the chaff, and we must be ever wary of equating the dream with the task. (shrink)

Two recent papers by Michael Burke bearing upon the persistence of people and commonplace things illustrate the fact that the quest for synchronic ontological economy is likely to encourage a disturbing diachronic proliferation of entities. This discussion argues that Burke's promise of ontological economy is seriously compromised by the fact that his proposed metaphysic does violence to standard intuitions concerning the persistence of people and commonplace things. In effect, Burke would have us achieve synchronic economy (rejection of coincident entities) by (...) postulating strongly counterintuitive transtemporal claims of numerical diversity. The argument is made that the price of Burkean economy is too high. (shrink)

Only those whose work and interests have led them to notice it, will have realised, in all probability, the remarkable extent to which the term organization has gained currency, or acquired new and special emphasis, throughout the entire range of scientific and sociological literature during the last ten or twenty years.In biology and bio-chemistry organization has been discussed or used as a technical term, mostly since 1930 by at least thirty well-known authors; amongst the more prominent are Huxley, Wilson, Woodger, (...) Cannon, Waddington, McDougall, Needham, Block, Hopkins and Sherrington. Under this magic term some authors refer to the physico-chemical nature of the cell or cytoplasm, and usually with special reference to selective or directive catalysis; others to the general constitution or structure of the organism and almost indistinguishable from general morphology and physiology; others to embryological development as such ; others more especially to “relations” between cells, organs and structural parts, often in an abstract sense; others refer more particularly to a hypothetical integrating and/or co-ordinating factor : a few refer to re-constitution from dissociated cells as observed in experiments with Sponges and Hydroids. (shrink)

In reading the last six books of Platos Laws in Prof. Burnet's excellent edition I notice some passages the corruptions in which seem to me to be due to that very common fault of copyists, false change of case usually due to the preceding word or words.